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Abstract
The Windows Vista operating system implements an interesting
model of multi-level integrity. We observe that in this model,
trusted code can be blamed for any information-flow attack; thus,
it is possible to eliminate such attacks by static analysis of trusted
code. We formalize this model by designing a type system that can
efficiently enforce data-flow integrity on Windows Vista. Type-
checking guarantees that objects whose contents are statically
trusted never contain untrusted values, regardless of what untrusted
code runs in the environment. Some of Windows Vista’s runtime
access checks are necessary for soundness; others are redundant
and can be optimized away.
Categories and Subject Descriptors D.4.6 [Operating Systems]:
Security and Protection—Access controls, Information flow con-
trols, Verification; D.2.4 [Software Engineering]: Program Verif-
ication—Correctness proofs; F.3.1 [Logics and Meanings of Pro-
grams]: Specifying and Verifying and Reasoning about Programs—
Specification techniques, Invariants, Mechanical verification
General Terms Security, Verification, Languages, Theory
Keywords dynamic access control, data-flow integrity, hybrid
type system, explicit substitution
1. Introduction
Commercial operating systems are seldom designed to prevent
information-flow attacks. Not surprisingly, such attacks are the
source of many serious security problems in these systems [44].
Microsoft’s Windows Vista operating system implements an in-
tegrity model that can potentially prevent such attacks. In some
ways, this model resembles other, classical models of multi-level
integrity [9]—every process and object1 is tagged with an integrity
label, the labels are ordered by levels of trust, and access control
is enforced across trust boundaries. In other ways, it is radically
different. While Windows Vista’s access control prevents low-
integrity processes from writing to high-integrity objects, it does
not prevent high-integrity processes from reading low-integrity
objects. Further, Windows Vista’s integrity labels are dynamic—
labels of processes and objects can change at runtime. This model
1 In this context, an object may be a file, a channel, a memory location, or
indeed any reference to data or executable code.
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allows processes at different trust levels to communicate, and al-
lows dynamic access control. At the same time, it admits various
information-flow attacks. Fortunately, it turns out that such attacks
require the participation of trusted processes, and can be eliminated
by code analysis.
In this paper, we provide a formalization of Windows Vista’s in-
tegrity model. In particular, we specify an information-flow prop-
erty called data-flow integrity (DFI), and present a static type sys-
tem that can enforce DFI on Windows Vista. Roughly, DFI prevents
any flow of data from the environment to objects whose contents
are trusted. Our type system relies on Windows Vista’s runtime ac-
cess checks for soundness. The key idea in the type system is to
maintain a static lower-bound label S for each object. While the
dynamic label of an object can change at runtime, the type system
ensures that it never goes below S, and the object never contains a
value that flows from a label lower than S. The label S is declared
by the programmer. Typechecking requires no other annotations,
and can be mechanized by an efficient algorithm.
By design, DFI does not prevent implicit flows [18]. Thus DFI
is weaker than noninterference [23]. Unfortunately, it is difficult
to enforce noninterference on a commercial operating system such
as Windows Vista. Implicit flows abound in such systems. Such
flows arise out of frequent, necessary interactions between trusted
code and the environment. They also arise out of covert control
channels which, given the scope of such systems, are impossible
to model sufficiently. Instead, DFI focuses on explicit flows [18].
This focus buys a reasonable compromise—DFI prevents a definite
class of attacks, and can be enforced efficiently on Windows Vista.
Several successful tools for malware detection follow this approach
[12, 52, 47, 49, 16, 37], and a similar approach guides the design
of some recent operating systems [19, 57].
Our definition of DFI is dual to standard definitions of secrecy
based on explicit flows—while secrecy prevents sensitive values
from flowing to the environment, DFI prevents the flow of values
from the environment to sensitive objects. Since there is a rich liter-
ature on type-based and logic-based analysis for such definitions of
secrecy [11, 3, 48, 13], it makes sense to adapt this analysis for DFI.
Such an adaptation works, but requires some care. Unlike secrecy,
DFI cannot be enforced without runtime checks. In particular, ac-
cess checks play a crucial role by restricting untrusted processes
that may run in the environment. Further, while secrecy prevents
any flow of high-security information to the environment, DFI al-
lows certain flows of low-security information from the environ-
ment. We need to introduce new technical devices for this purpose,
including a technique based on explicit substitution [4] to track pre-
cise sources of values. This device is required not only to specify
DFI precisely but also to prove that our type system enforces DFI.
We design a simple higher-order process calculus that simu-
lates Windows Vista’s security environment [31, 17, 43]. In this
language, processes can fork new processes, create new objects,
change the labels of processes and objects, and read, write, and ex-
ecute objects in exactly the same ways as Windows Vista allows.
Our type system exploits Windows Vista’s runtime access checks
to enforce DFI, and can recognize many correct programs. At the
same time, our type system subsumes Windows Vista’s execution
controls, allowing them to be optimized away.
1.1 Summary of contributions
To sum up, we make the following main contributions in this paper:
• We propose DFI as a practical multi-level integrity property
in the setting of Windows Vista, and formalize DFI using a
semantic technique based on explicit substitution.
• We present a type system that can efficiently enforce DFI on
Windows Vista. Typechecking guarantees DFI regardless of
what untrusted code runs in the environment.
• We show that while most of Windows Vista’s runtime access
checks are required to enforce DFI, Windows Vista’s execution
controls are redundant and can be optimized away.
1.2 Outline
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we
introduce Windows Vista’s security environment, and show how
DFI may be violated in that environment. In Section 3, we design
a calculus that simulates Windows Vista’s security environment,
equip the calculus with a semantics based on explicit substitution,
and formalize DFI in the calculus. In Section 4, we present a
system of integrity types and effects for this calculus. In Section 5,
we prove soundness and other properties of typing. Finally, in
Section 6, we discuss limitations and contributions with respect
to related work and conclude. Supplementary material, including
proof details and an efficient typechecking algorithm, appear in the
appendix.
2. Windows Vista’s integrity model
In this section, we provide a brief overview of Windows Vista’s
integrity model.2 In particular, we introduce Windows Vista’s se-
curity environment, and show how DFI may be violated in that en-
vironment. We observe that such attacks require the participation
of trusted processes.
2.1 Windows Vista’s security environment
In Windows Vista, every process and object is tagged with a dy-
namic integrity label. We indicate such labels in brackets ( ) below.
Labels are related by a total order ⊑, meaning “at most as trusted
as”. Let a range over processes, ω over objects, and P,O over la-
bels. Processes can fork new processes, create new objects, change
the labels of processes and objects, and read, write, and execute
objects. In particular, a process with label P can:
(i) fork a new process a(P);
(ii) create a new object ω(P);
(iii) lower its own label;
(iv) change the label of an object ω(O) to O′ iff O ⊔ O′ ⊑ P;
(v) read an object ω(O);
(vi) write an object ω(O) iff O ⊑ P;
(vii) execute an object ω(O) by lowering its own label to P ⊓O.
Rules (i) and (ii) are straightforward. Rule (iii) is guided by the
principle of least privilege [34], and is used in Windows Vista to
implement a feature called user access control (UAC) [43]. This
feature lets users execute commands with lower privileges when
2 Windows Vista further implements a discretionary access control model,
which we ignore in this paper.
appropriate. For example, when a system administrator opens a new
shell (typically with label High), a new process is forked with label
Medium; the shell is then run by the new process. When an Internet
browser is opened, it is always run by a new process whose label
is lowered to Low; thus any code that gets run by the browser gets
the label Low—by Rule (i)—and any file that is downloaded by the
browser gets the label Low—by Rule (ii).
Rules (iv) and (v) are useful in various ways, but can be dan-
gerous if not used carefully. (We show some attacks to illustrate
this point below.) In particular, Rule (iv) allows unprotected ob-
jects to be protected by trusted processes by raising their labels,
and Rule (v) allows processes to read objects at lower trust levels.
At the same time, Rule (iv) facilitates dynamic access control, and
Rule (v) facilitates communication across trust boundaries.
Rule (vi) protects objects from being written by processes at
lower trust levels. Thus, for example, untrusted code forked by a
browser cannot affect local user files. User code cannot modify
registry keys protected by a system administrator. Rule (vii) is
part of UAC; it prevents users from accidentally launching less
trusted executables with higher privileges. For example, a virus
downloaded from the Internet cannot run in a trusted user shell.
Neither can system code dynamically link user libraries.
2.2 Some attacks
We now show some attacks that remain possible in this environ-
ment. Basically, these attacks exploit Rules (iv) and (v) to bypass
Rules (vi) and (vii).
(Write and copy) By Rule (vi), a(P) cannot modify ω(O) if P ⊏
O. However, a(P) can modify some object ω′(P), and then
some process b(O) can copy ω′(P)’s content to ω(O). Thus,
Rule (iv) can be exploited to bypass Rule (vi).
(Copy and execute) By Rule (vii), a(P) cannot execute ω(O) at
P if O ⊏ P. However, a(P) can copy ω(O)’s content to some
object ω′(P) and then execute ω′(P). Thus, Rule (iv) can be
exploited to bypass Rule (vii).
(Unprotect, write, and protect) By Rule (vi), a(P) cannot mod-
ify ω(O) if P ⊏ O. However, some process b(O) can unprotect
ω(O) to ω(P), then a(P) can modify ω(P), and then b(O) can
protect ω(P) back to ω(O). Thus, Rule (v) can be exploited to
bypass Rule (vi).
(Copy, protect, and execute) By Rule (vii), a(P) cannot execute
ω(O) at P if O ⊏ P. However, some process b(O) can copy
ω(O)’s content to an object ω′(O), and then a(P) can protect
ω′(O) to ω′(P) and execute ω′(P). Thus, Rules (iv) and (v) can
be exploited to bypass Rule (vii).
Next, we show that all of these attacks can violate DFI. At the same
time, we observe that access control forces the participation of a
trusted process (one with the higher label) in any such attack.
• In (Write and copy) or (Unprotect, write, and protect), sup-
pose that the contents of ω(O) are trusted, and P is the label of
untrusted code, with P ⊏ O. Then data can flow from a(P) to
ω(O), violating DFI, as above. Fortunately, some process b(O)
can be blamed here.
• In (Copy and execute) or (Copy, protect, and execute), sup-
pose that the contents of some object ω′′(P) are trusted, and O
is the label of untrusted code, with O ⊏ P. Then data can flow
from some process b(O) to ω′′(P), violating DFI, as follows:
b(O) packs code to modify ω′′(P) and writes the code to ω(O),
and a(P) unpacks and executes that code, as above. Fortunately,
a(P) can be blamed here.
Our type system can eliminate such attacks by restricting trusted
processes (Section 4). (Obviously, the type system cannot restrict
untrusted code running in the environment.) Conceptually, this
guarantee can be cast as Wadler and Findler’s “well-typed programs
can’t be blamed” [51]. We rely on the fact that a trusted process
can be blamed for any violation of DFI; it follows that if all trusted
processes are well-typed, there cannot be any violation of DFI.
3. A calculus for analyzing DFI on Windows Vista
To formalize our approach, we now design a simple higher-order
process calculus that simulates Windows Vista’s security environ-
ment. We first introduce the syntax and informal semantics, and
present some examples of programs and attacks in the language.
We then present a formal semantics, guided by a precise character-
ization of explicit flows.
3.1 Syntax and informal semantics
Several simplifications appear in the syntax of the language. We
describe processes by their code. We use variables as object names,
and let objects contain packed code or names of other objects. We
enforce a mild syntactic restriction on nested packing, which makes
typechecking significantly more efficient (Appendix B; also see
below). Finally, we elide conditionals—for our purposes, the code
if condition then a else b
can be conservatively analyzed by composing a and b in parallel.
(DFI is a safety property in the sense of [7], and the safety of the
latter code implies that of the former. We discuss this point in more
detail in Section 3.3.)
Values include variables, unit, and packed expressions. Expres-
sions include those for forking new processes, creating new objects,
changing the labels of processes and objects, and reading, writing,
and executing objects. They also include standard expressions for
evaluation and returning results (see Gordon and Hankin’s concur-
rent object calculus [24]).
f, g ::= expression
f  g fork
t action
let x = f in g evaluation
r result
t ::= action
new(x # S) create object
[P] a change process label
〈O〉 ω change object label
!ω read object
ω := x write object
exec ω execute object
r ::= result
x, y, z, . . . , ω variable
unit unit
a, b ::= process
a  b fork
t action
let x = a in b evaluation
u value
u, v ::= value
r result
pack(f) packed expression
Syntactically, we distinguish between processes and expressions:
while every expression is a process, not every process is an ex-
pression. For example, the process pack(f) is not an expression,
although the process [P] pack(f) is. Expressions can be packed,
but processes in general cannot. In particular, a process cannot be
of the form pack(pack(. . . )). (Such a process can, however, be
written as let x = pack(. . . ) in pack(x).) The benefits of this dis-
tinction become clear in Section 5, where we discuss mechanical
typechecking. However, for the bulk of the paper, the reader may
ignore this distinction; indeed, neither the semantics nor the type
system are affected by this distinction.
Processes have the following informal meanings.
• a  b forks a new process a with the current process label and
continues as b (see Rule (i)).
• new(x # S) creates a new object ω with the current process
label, initializes ω with x, and returns ω (see Rule (ii)); the
annotation S is used by the type system (Section 4) and has
no runtime significance.
• [P] a changes the current process label to P and continues as
a; it blocks if the current process label is lower than P (see
Rule (iii)).
• 〈O〉 ω changes ω’s label to O and returns unit; it blocks if ω is
not bound to an object at runtime, or the current process label
is lower than ω’s label or O (see Rule (iv)).
• !ω returns the value stored in ω; it blocks if ω is not bound to
an object at runtime (see Rule (v)).
• ω := x writes the value x to ω and returns unit; it blocks if ω is
not bound to an object at runtime, or if the current process label
is lower than ω’s label (see Rule (vi)).
• exec ω unpacks the value stored in ω to a process f , lowers the
current process label with ω’s label, and executes f ; it blocks if
ω is not bound to an object at runtime or if the value stored in
ω is not a packed expression (see Rule (vii)).
• let x = a in b executes a, binds the value returned by a to x,
and continues as b with x bound.
• u returns itself.
3.2 Programming examples
We now consider some programming examples in the language.
We assume that Low, Medium, High, and ⊤ are labels, ordered in
the obvious way. We assume that the top-level process always runs
with ⊤, which is the most trusted label.
Example 3.1. Suppose that a Medium user opens an Internet
browser ie.exe with Low privileges (recall UAC), and clicks on a
url that contains virus.exe; the virus contains code to overwrite
the command shell executable cmd.exe, which has label ⊤.
p1 , let cmd.exe = new(. . . # ⊤) in
let url = [Low] new(. . . # Low) in
let binIE = pack(let x = !url in exec x) in
let ie.exe = new(binIE # ⊤) in
[Medium] (. . .  [Low] exec ie.exe) 
[Low] (let binVirus = pack(cmd.exe := . . . ) in
let virus.exe = new(binVirus # Low) in
url := virus.exe 
. . . )
This code may eventually reduce to
q1 , [Medium] (. . .  [Low] cmd.exe := . . . ) 
[Low] (. . . )
However, at this point the write to cmd.exe blocks due to access
control. (Recall that a process with label Low cannot write to an
object with label ⊤.)
Example 3.2. Next, consider the following attack, based on the
(Copy, protect, and execute) attack in Section 2.2. A Medium user
downloads a virus from the Internet that contains code to erase the
user’s home directory (home), and saves it by default in setup.exe.
A High administrator protects and executes setup.exe.
p2 , let url = [Low] new(. . . # Low) in
let setup.exe = [Low] new(. . . # Low) in
let binIE = pack(let z = !url in
let x = !z in setup.exe := x) in
let ie.exe = new(binIE # ⊤) in
let home = [Medium] new(. . . # Medium) in
let empty = unit in
[High] (· · · 
let = 〈High〉 setup.exe in
exec setup.exe) 
[Medium] (. . .  [Low] exec ie.exe) 
[Low] (let binVirus = pack(home := empty) in
let virus.exe = new(binVirus # Low) in
url := virus.exe 
. . . )
This code may eventually reduce to
q2 , [High] (. . .  home := empty) 
[Medium] (. . . ) 
[Low] (. . . )
The user’s home directory may be erased at this point. (Recall that
access control does not prevent a process with label High from
writing to an object with label Medium.)
3.3 An overview of DFI
Informally, DFI requires that objects whose contents are trusted at
some label S never contain values that flow from labels lower than
S. In Example 3.1, we trust the contents of cmd.exe at label ⊤,
as declared by the static annotation ⊤. DFI is not violated in this
example, since access control prevents the flow of data from Low to
cmd.exe. On the other hand, in Example 3.2, we trust the contents
of home at label Medium. DFI is violated in this example, since the
value empty flows from Low to home.
By design, DFI is a safety property [7]—roughly, it can be
defined as a set of behaviors such that for any behavior that not in
that set, there is some finite prefix of that behavior that is not in that
set. To that end, DFI considers only explicit flows of data. Denning
and Denning characterizes explicit flows [18] roughly as follows:
a flow of x is explicit if and only if the flow depends abstractly on
x (that is, it depends on the existence of x, but not on the value
x). Thus, for example, the violation of DFI in Example 3.2 does
not depend on the value empty—any other value causes the same
violation. Conversely, empty is not dangerous in itself. Consider
the reduced process q2 in Example 3.2. Without any knowledge of
execution history, we cannot conclude that DFI is violated in q2.
Indeed, it is perfectly legitimate for a High-process to execute the
code
home := empty
intentionally, say as part of administration. However, in Exam-
ple 3.2, we know that this code is executed by unpacking some
code designed by a Low-process. The violation of DFI is due to
this history.
It follows that in order to detect violations of DFI, we must dis-
tinguish between various instances of a value, and track the sources
of those instances during execution. We maintain this execution
history in the operational semantics (Section 3.4), by a technique
based on explicit substitution [4].
Before we move on, let us ease the tension between DFI and
conditionals. In general, conditionals can cause implicit flows [18];
a flow of x can depend on the value x if x appears in the condition
of some code that causes that flow. For example, the code
if x = zero then ω := zero else ω := one
causes an implicit flow of x to ω that depends on the value x.
We can abstract away this dependency by interpreting the code
if condition then a else b as the code a  b. Recall that DFI is a
safety property. Following [33], the safety of a  b can be expressed
by the logical formula F , Fa ∧ Fb, where Fa is the formula that
expresses the safety of a, and Fb is the formula that expresses the
safety of b. Likewise, the safety of if condition then a else b
can be expressed by the formula F ′ , (condition ⇒ Fa) ∧
(¬condition ⇒ Fb). Clearly, we have F ⇒ F ′, so that the code
if condition then a else b is a refinement of the code a  b. It is
well-known that safety is preserved under refinement [33].
But implicit flows are of serious concern in many applications;
one may wonder whether focusing on explicit flows is even desir-
able. Consider the code above; the implicit flow from x to ω vio-
lates noninterference, if x is an untrusted value and the contents of
ω are trusted. In contrast, DFI is not violated in the interpreted code
ω := zero  ω := one
if zero and one are trusted values. Clearly, DFI ignores the implicit
flow from x to ω. But this may be fine—DFI can be used to prove
an invariant such as “the contents of ω are always boolean values”.
Note that the code
ω := x
does not maintain this invariant, since x may be an arbitrary value.
Thankfully, DFI is violated in this code.
3.4 An operational semantics that tracks explicit flows
We now present a chemical-style operational semantics for the
language, that tracks explicit flows.3 We begin by extending the
syntax with some auxiliary forms.
a, b ::= process
· · · source process
ω
O
7→ x store
(νx/µ@P) a explicit substitution
µ ::= substituted value
u value
new(x # S) object initialization
The process ω O7→ x asserts that the object ω contains x and is
protected with label O. A key feature of the semantics is that objects
store values “by instance”—only variables may appear in stores.
We use explicit substitution to track and distinguish between the
sources of various instances of a substituted value. Specifically, the
process (νx/µ@P) a creates a fresh variable x, records that x is
bound to µ by a process with label P, and continues as a with x
bound. Here x is an instance of µ and P is the source of x. If µ
is a value, then this process is behaviorally equivalent to a with x
substituted by µ. For example, in Example 3.2 the source of the
instance of empty in binVirus is Low; this fact is described by
3 This presentation is particularly convenient for defining and proving DFI;
of course, a concrete implementation of the language may rely on a lighter
semantics that does not track explicit flows.
Local reduction a P;σ−→ bp
(Reduct evaluate)
let x = u in a
P;σ
−→ (νx/u@P) a
(Reduct new)
new(x # S) P;σ−→ (νω/new(x # S)@P) (ω P7→ x  ω)
(Reduct read)
ω
σ
= ω′
ω
O
7→ x  !ω′
P;σ
−→ ω
O
7→ x  x
(Reduct write)
ω
σ
= ω′ O ⊑ P
ω
O
7→  ω′ := x
P;σ
−→ ω
O
7→ x  unit
(Reduct execute)
ω
σ
= ω′ pack(f) ∈ σ(x) P′ = P ⊓O
ω
O
7→ x  exec ω′
P;σ
−→ ω
O
7→ x  [P′] f
(Reduct un/protect)
ω
σ
= ω′ O ⊔ O′ ⊑ P
ω
O
7→ x  〈O′〉 ω′
P;σ
−→ ω
O′
7→ x  unit
Structural equivalence a ≡ b
(Struct bind)
EP;σJa{x/y}KP′,σ′ ≡ EP;σJ(νx/y@P
′) aKP′,σ′
(Struct substitution)
x /∈ fv(EP,σ) ∪ bv(EP,σ) fv(µ) ∩ bv(EP,σ) = ∅
EP;σJ(νx/µ@P
′′) aKP′,σ′ ≡ (νx/µ@P
′′) EP,{x/µ@P′′}∪σJaKP′,σ′
(Struct fork)
fv(a) ∩ bv(EP,σ) = ∅
EP;σJa  bKP,σ′ ≡ a  EP;σJbKP,σ′
(Struct store)
[P] (ω
O
7→ x  a) ≡ ω
O
7→ x  [P] a
(Struct equiv)
≡ is an equivalence
Global reduction a P;σ−→ bp
(Reduct context)
a
P′;σ′
−→ b
EP;σJaKP′;σ′
P;σ
−→ EP;σJbKP′;σ′
(Reduct congruence)
a ≡ a′ a′
P;σ
−→ b′ b′ ≡ b
a
P;σ
−→ b
rewriting the process q2 as
(νx/empty@Low) [High] (· · ·  home := x)  . . .
DFI prevents this particular instance (x) of empty from being
written to home; but it allows other instances whose sources are
at least as trusted as Medium. The rewriting follows a structural
equivalence rule (Struct bind), explained later in the section.
While explicit substitution has been previously used in language
implementations, we seem to be the first to adapt this device to
track data flow in a concurrent language. In particular, we use
explicit substitution both to specify DFI (in Definitions 3.3 and 3.4)
and to verify it statically (in proofs of Theorems 5.4 and 5.7). We
defer a more detailed discussion on this technique to Section 6.
We call sets of the form {x1/µ1@P1, . . . , xk/µk@Pk} substi-
tution environments.
Definition 3.3 (Explicit flows). A variable x flows from a label
P or lower in a substitution environment σ, written x
σ
H P, if
x/µ@P′ ∈ σ for some µ and P′ such that either P′ ⊑ P, or µ
is a variable and (inductively) µ σH P.
In other words, x flows from a label P or lower if x is an
instance of a value substituted at P or lower. In Definition 3.4
below, we formalize DFI as a property of objects, as follows: an
object is protected from label L if it never contains instances that
flow from L or lower. We define σ(x) to be the set of values
in σ that x is an instance of: x ∈ σ(x), and if (inductively)
y ∈ σ(x) and y/u@ ∈ σ for some y and u, then u ∈ σ(x).
The operational semantics ensures that substitution environments
accurately associate instances of values with their runtime sources.
We now present rules for local reduction, structural equivalence,
and global reduction. Reductions are of the form a P;σ−→ b, mean-
ing that “process a may reduce to process b with label P in sub-
stitution environment σ”. Structural equivalences are of the form
a ≡ b, meaning that “process a may be rewritten as process b”.
The notions of free and bound variables (fv and bv) are standard.
We write x σ= y if σ(x) ∩ σ(y) 6= ∅, that is, there is a value that
both x and y are instances of.
We first look at the local reduction rules. In (Reduct evaluate),
a substitution binds x to the intermediate value u and associates
x with its runtime source P. (Reduct new) creates a new store
denoted by a fresh variable ω, initializes the store, and returns
ω; a substitution binds ω to the initialization of the new object
and associates ω with its runtime source P. The value x and the
trust annotation S in the initialization are used by the type system
(Section 4). The remaining local reduction rules describe reactions
with a store, following the informal semantics.
Next, we define evaluation contexts [20]. An evaluation context
is of the form EP;σ, and contains a hole of the form •P′;σ′ ; the
context yields a process that executes with label P in substitution
environment σ, if the hole is plugged by a process that executes
with label P′ in substitution environment σ′.
EP;σ ::= evaluation context
•P;σ hole
let x = EP;σ in b sequential evaluation
EP;σ  b fork left
a  EP;σ fork right
(νx/µ@P′) EP;{x/µ@P′}∪σ explicit substitution
[P′] EP′;σ (P
′ ⊑ P) lowering of process label
Evaluation can proceed sequentially inside let processes, and in
parallel under forks [24]; it can also proceed under explicit sub-
stitutions and lowering of process labels. In particular, note how
evaluation contexts build substitution environments from explicit
substitutions, and labels from changes of process labels. We denote
by EP;σJaKP′;σ′ the process obtained by plugging the hole •P′;σ′ in
EP;σ with a.
Next, we look at the structural equivalence and global reduction
rules. In (Struct bind), a{x/y} is the process obtained from a
by the usual capture-avoiding substitution of x by y. The rule
states that explicit substitution may invert usual substitution to
create instances as required. In particular, variables that appear in
packed code can be associated with the label of the process that
packs that code, even though those variables may be bound later—
by (Reduct evaluate)—when that code is eventually unpacked at
some other label. For example, the instance of empty in binVirus
may be correctly associated with Low (the label at which it is
packed) instead of High (the label at which it is unpacked). Thus, in
combination, the rules (Reduct evaluate) and (Struct bind) track
precise sources of values by explicit substitution.
By (Struct substitution), substitutions can float across contexts
under standard scoping restrictions. By (Struct fork), forked pro-
cesses can float across contexts [24], but must remain under the
same process label. By (Struct store), stores can be shared across
further contexts.
Reduction is extended with contexts and structural equivalence
in the natural way.
Finally, we formalize DFI in our language, as promised.
Definition 3.4 (DFI). The object ω is protected from label L by
process a if there is no process b, substitution environment σ, and
instance x such that a  [L] b ⊤,∅−→⋆ E⊤,∅Jω 7→ xK⊤,σ and x
σ
H L.
4. A type system to enforce DFI
We now show a type system to enforce DFI in the language. (The
formal protection guarantee for well-typed code appears in Sec-
tion 5.) We begin by introducing types and typing judgments. We
then present typing rules and informally explain their properties.
Finally, we consider some examples of typechecking. An efficient
algorithm for typechecking is outlined in Appendix B.
4.1 Types and effects
The core grammar of types is shown below. Here effects are simply
labels; these labels belong to the same ordering ⊑ as in the opera-
tional semantics.
τ ::= type
Obj(T ) object
∇P.Bin(T ) packed code
Unit unit
T ::= static approximation
τE type and effect
• The type Obj(τ S) is given to an object that contains values of
type τ . Such contents may not flow from labels lower than S; in
other words, S indicates the trust on the contents of this object.
DFI follows from the soundness of object types.
• The type ∇P.Bin(τE) is given to packed code that can be run
with label P. Values returned by the code must be of type τ and
may not flow from labels lower than E. In fact, our type system
admits a subtyping rule that allows such code to be run in a
typesafe manner with any label that is at most P.
• The effect E is given to a value that does not flow from labels
lower than E.
When creating an object, the programmer declares the trust on the
contents of that object. Roughly, an object returned by new( # S)
gets a type Obj( S). For example, in Examples 3.1 and 3.2, we de-
clare the trust ⊤ on the contents of cmd.exe and the trust Medium
on the contents of home.
Core typing judgments Γ ⊢P a : T
(Typ unit)
Γ ⊢P unit : Unit
P
(Typ variable)
x : τE ∈ Γ
Γ ⊢P x : τ
E⊓P
(Typ fork)
Γ ⊢P a : Γ ⊢P b : T
Γ ⊢P a  b : T
(Typ limit)
Γ ⊢P′ a : T
Γ ⊢P [P
′] a : T
(Typ evaluate)
Γ ⊢P a : T
′ Γ, x : T ′ ⊢P b : T
Γ ⊢P let x = a in b : T
(Typ substitute)
Γ ⊢P′ µ : T
′ Γ, x : T ′ ⊢P a : T
Γ ⊢P (νx/µ@P
′) a : T
(Typ store)
{ω : Obj(τ S) , x : τE} ⊆ Γ S ⊑ O ⊓ E
Γ ⊢P ω
O
7→ x : P
(Typ new)
Γ ⊢P x : τ
E
S ⊑ E
Γ ⊢P new(x # S) : Obj(τ S)P
(Typ pack)
Γ ⊢P′ f : T f
Γ ⊢P pack(f) : ∇P′ .Bin(T )
P
(Typ un/protect)
Γ ⊢P ω : Obj(
S)E S ⊑ O
Γ ⊢P 〈O〉 ω : Unit
P
∗P ⇒ ∗E
(Typ write)
Γ ⊢P ω : Obj(τ
S)E Γ ⊢P x : τ
E′
S ⊑ E′
Γ ⊢P ω := x : Unit
P
∗P ⇒ ∗E
(Typ read)
ω : Obj(τ S)E ∈ Γ
Γ ⊢P !ω : τ
S⊓P
∗(P ⊓ S)⇒ ∗E
(Typ execute)
ω : Obj((∇P′ .Bin(τ
E′)) S)E ∈ Γ P ⊑ P′ ⊓ S
Γ ⊢P exec ω : τ
E′⊓P
∗P⇒ ∗E
A typing environment Γ contains typing hypotheses of the form
x : T . We assume that any variable has at most one typing hypothe-
sis in Γ, and define dom(Γ) as the set of variables that have typing
hypotheses in Γ. A typing judgment is of the form Γ ⊢P a : T ,
where P is the label of the process a, T is the type and effect of
values returned by a, and fv(a) ⊆ dom(Γ).
4.2 Core typing rules
In the previous page, we present typing rules that enforce the
core static discipline required for our protection guarantee. Some
of these rules have side conditions that involve a predicate ∗ on
labels. These conditions, which are marked in shaded boxes , are
ignored in our first reading of these rules. (The predicate ∗ is true
everywhere in the absence of a special label ⊥, introduced later
in the section.) One of the rules has a condition that involves a
predicate  on expressions; we introduce that predicate in the
discussion below. The typing rules preserve several invariants.
(1) Code that runs with a label P cannot return values that have
effects higher than P.
(2) The contents of an object of type Obj( S) cannot have effects
lower than S.
(3) The dynamic label that protects an object of type Obj( S)
cannot be lower than S.
(4) An object of type Obj( S) cannot be created at a label lower
than S.
(5) Packed code of type ∇P. Bin( ) must remain well-typed
when unpacked at any label lower than P.
Invariant (1) follows from our interpretation of effects. To preserve
this invariant in (Typ variable), for example, the effect of x at P is
obtained by lowering x’s effect in the typing environment with P.
In (Typ store), typechecking is independent of the process
label, that is, a store is well-typed if and only if it is so at any
process label; recall that by (Struct store) stores can float across
contexts, and typing must be preserved by structural equivalence.
Further, (Typ store) introduces Invariants (2) and (3). Invariant
(2) follows from our interpretation of static trust annotations. To
preserve this invariant we require Invariant (3), which ensures that
access control prevents code running with labels less trusted than S
from writing to objects whose contents are trusted at S.
By (Typ new), the effect E of the initial content of a new
object cannot be lower than S. Recall that by (Reduct new), the
new object is protected with the process label P; since P ⊒ E
by Invariant (1), we have P ⊒ S, so that both Invariants (2) and
(3) are preserved. Conversely, if P ⊏ S then the process does not
typecheck; Invariant (4) follows.
Let us now look carefully at the other rules relevant to Invari-
ants (2) and (3); these rules—combined with access control—are
the crux of enforcing DFI. (Typ write) preserves Invariant (2), re-
stricting trusted code from writing values to ω that may flow from
labels lower than S. (Such code may not be restricted by access
control.) Conversely, access control prevents code with labels lower
than S from writing to ω, since by Invariant (3), ω’s label is at least
as trusted as S. (Typ un/protect) preserves Invariant (3), allowing
ω’s label to be either raised or lowered without falling below S.
In (Typ read), the effect of a value read from ω at P is approxi-
mated by S—the least trusted label from which ω’s contents may
flow—and further lowered with P to preserve Invariant (1).
In (Typ pack), packing code requires work akin to proof-
carrying code [39]. Type safety for the code is proved and “carried”
in its type ∇P′ . Bin(T ), independently of the current process la-
bel. Specifically, it is proved that when the packed code is unpacked
by a process with label P′, the value of executing that code has type
and effect T . In Section 5 we show that such a proof in fact allows
the packed code to be unpacked by any process with label P ⊑ P′,
and the type and effect of the value of executing that code can
be related to T (Invariant (5)). This invariant is key to decidable
and efficient typechecking (Appendix B). Of course, code may
be packed to run only at specific process labels, by requiring the
appropriate label changes.
Preserving Invariant (5) entails, in particular, preserving Invari-
ant (4) at all labels P ⊑ P′. Since a new expression that is not
guarded by a change of the process label may be run with any label
P, that expression must place the least possible trust on the contents
of the object it creates. This condition is enforced by predicate :
new(x # S) , ∀P. S ⊑ P
(f  g) , f ∧ g
(let x = f in g) , f ∧ g
(. . . ) , true
(Typ execute) relies on Invariant (5); further, it checks that the
label at which the code is unpacked (P) is at most as trusted as
the label at which the code may have been packed (approximated
by S). This check prevents privilege escalation—code that would
perhaps block if run with a lower label cannot be packed to run
with a higher label. For example, recall that in Example 3.2, the
code binVirus is packed at Low and then copied into setup.exe.
While a High-process can legitimately execute home := empty
(so that the code is typed and is not blocked by access control), it
should not run that code by unpacking binVirus from setup.exe.
The type system prevents this violation. Let setup.exe be of type
Obj((∇ . Bin( ))S). Then (Typ store) requires that S ⊑ Low,
and (Typ execute) requires that High ⊑ S (contradiction).
Because we do not maintain an upper bound on the dynamic
label of an executable, we cannot rely on the lowering of the
process label in (Reduct execute) to prevent privilege escalation.
(While it is possible to extend our type system to maintain such
upper bounds, such an extension does not let us typecheck any more
correct programs than we already do.) In Section 5, we show that
the lowering of the process label can in fact be safely eliminated.
In (Typ evaluate), typing proceeds sequentially, propagating
the type and effect of the intermediate process to the continuation.
(Typ substitution) is similar, except that the substituted value is
typed under the process label recorded in the substitution, rather
than under the current process label. In (Typ limit), the continua-
tion is typed under the changed process label. In (Typ fork), the
forked process is typed under the current process label.
4.3 Typing rules for stuck code
While the rules above rely on access control for soundness, they do
not exploit runtime protection provided by access control to type-
check more programs. For example, the reduced process q1 in Ex-
ample 3.1 cannot yet be typed, although we have checked that DFI
is not violated in q1. Below we introduce stuck typing to identify
processes that provably block by access control at runtime. Stuck
typing allows us to soundly type more programs by composition.
(The general principle that is followed here is that narrowing the
set of possible execution paths improves the precision of the anal-
ysis.) This powerful technique of combining static typing and dy-
namic access control for runtime protection is quite close to hybrid
typechecking [21]. We defer a more detailed discussion of this tech-
nique to Section 6.
We introduce the static approximation Stuck for processes that
do not return values, but may have side effects.
T ::= static approximation
· · · code
Stuck typing judgments Γ ⊢P a : Stuck
(Typ escalate stuck)
P ⊏ P
′
Γ ⊢P [P
′] a : Stuck
(Typ write stuck)
ω : Obj( S)E ∈ Γ P ⊏ S
Γ ⊢P ω := x : Stuck
∗E
(Typ un/protect stuck)
ω : Obj( S)E ∈ Γ P ⊏ S ⊔O
Γ ⊢P 〈O〉 ω : Stuck
∗E
(Typ subsumption stuck-I)
: Stuck ∈ Γ
Γ ⊢P a : Stuck
(Typ subsumption stuck-II)
Γ ⊢P a : Stuck
Γ ⊢P a : T
Stuck stuck process
We now present rules for stuck-typing. As before, in our first read-
ing of these rules we ignore the side conditions in shaded boxes
(which involve the predicate ∗). (Typ write stuck) identifies code
that tries to write to an object whose static trust annotation S is
higher than the current process label P. By Invariant (3), the la-
bel O that protects the object must be at least as high as S; thus
P ⊏ O and the code must block at runtime due to access control.
For example, let cmd.exe be of type Obj( ⊤) in Example 3.1. By
(Typ write stuck), the code q1 is well-typed since Low ⊏ ⊤. (Typ
un/protect stuck) is similar to (Typ write stuck); it further identi-
fies code that tries to raise the label of an object beyond the current
process label. (Typ escalate stuck) identifies code that tries to raise
the current process label. All such processes block at runtime due
to access control.
By (Typ subsumption stuck-I), processes that are typed under
stuck hypotheses are considered stuck as well. For example, this
rule combines with (Typ evaluate) to trivially type a continuation
b if the intermediate process a is identified as stuck. Finally, by
(Typ subsumption stuck-II), stuck processes can have any type
and effect, since they cannot return values.
4.4 Typing rules for untrusted code
Typing must guarantee protection in arbitrary environments. Since
the protection guarantee is derived via a type preservation theorem,
arbitrary untrusted code needs to be accommodated by the type
system. We assume that untrusted code runs with a special label
⊥, introduced into the total order by assuming ⊥ ⊑ L for all L. We
now present rules that allow arbitrary interpretation of types at ⊥.
By (Typ subsumption ⊥-I), placing the static trust ⊥ on the
contents of an object amounts to assuming any type for those
contents as required. By (Typ subsumption ⊥-II), a value that
has effect ⊥ may be assumed to have any type as required. These
rules provide the necessary flexibility for typing any untrusted code
using the other typing rules. On the other hand, arbitrary subtyping
with objects can in general be unsound—we now need to be careful
Typing rules for untrusted code
(Typ subsumption⊥-I)
Γ, ω : Obj( ⊥)E ⊢P a : T
Γ, ω : Obj(τ⊥)E ⊢P a : T
(Typ subsumption⊥-II)
Γ, x : ⊥ ⊢P a : T
Γ, x : τ⊥ ⊢P a : T
when typing trusted code. For example, consider the code
ω2
High
7→ x  ω1
Low
7→ ω2  [High] let z = !ω1 in z := u
A High-process reads the name of an object (ω2) from a Low-object
(ω1), and then writes u to that object (ω2). DFI is violated if ω2
has type Obj( High) and u flows from Low. Unfortunately, it turns
out that this code can be typed under process label ⊤ and typing
hypotheses
ω2 : Obj(τ
High
2 )
⊤, ω1 : Obj(Obj(τ
High
2 )
⊥)⊤, x : τHigh2 , u : τ
Low
1
Specifically, the intermediate judgment
z : Obj(τHigh2 )
⊥, . . . , u : τ Low1 ⊢High z := u :
can be derived by adjusting the type of z in the typing environment
to Obj(τ Low1 ) with (Typ subsumption ⊥-II).
This source of unsoundness is eliminated if some of the effects
in our typing rules are required to be trusted, that is, to be higher
than ⊥. Accordingly we introduce the predicate ∗, such that for
any label L, ∗L simply means L ⊐ ⊥. We now revisit the typ-
ing rules earlier in the section and focus on the side conditions in
shaded boxes (which involve ∗). In some of those conditions, we
care about trusted effects only if the process label is itself trusted.
With these conditions, (Typ write) prevents typechecking the of-
fending write above, since the effect of z in the typing environment
is untrusted.
4.5 Compromise
The label ⊥ introduced above is an artificial construct to tolerate
a degree of “anarchy” in the type system. We may want to specify
that a certain label (such as Low) acts like ⊥, i.e., is compromised.
The typing judgment Γ ⊢P a : T despite C allows us to type
arbitrary code a running at a compromised label C by assuming that
C is the same as ⊥, i.e., by extending the total order with C ⊑ ⊥
(so that all labels that are at most as trusted as C collapse to ⊥).
We do not consider labels compromised at runtime (as in Gordon
and Jeffrey’s type system for conditional secrecy [26]); however
we do not anticipate any technical difficulty in including runtime
compromise in our type system.
4.6 Typechecking examples
We now show some examples of typechecking.
We begin with the program p2 in Example 3.2. Recall that DFI
is violated in p2. Suppose that we try to derive the typing judgment
· · · ⊢⊤ p2 : despite Low
This amounts to deriving · · · ⊢⊤ p2 : by assuming Low ⊑ ⊥.
As a first step, we apply (Typ new), (Typ read), (Typ write),
(Typ pack), and (Typ evaluate), directed by syntax, until we have
the following typing environment.
Γ = . . . ,
url : Obj( Low)⊤,
setup.exe : Obj( Low)⊤,
binIE : (∇Low.Bin(Unit))
⊤,
ie.exe : Obj((∇Low.Bin(Unit))
⊤)⊤,
home : Obj( Medium)⊤
empty : Unit⊤
The only complication that may arise is in this step is in deriving
an intermediate judgment
. . . , z : Low ⊢⊤ !z :
Here, we can apply (Typ subsumption ⊥-II) to adjust the typing
hypothesis of z to Obj( )⊥, so that (Typ read) may apply.
After this step, we need to derive a judgment of the form:
Γ ⊢⊤ [High] (. . . )  [Medium] (. . . )  [Low] (. . . )
Now, we apply (Typ fork). We first check that the code [Low] (. . . )
is well-typed. (In fact, untrusted code is always well-typed, as we
show in Section 5.) The judgment
Γ ⊢Low home := empty : Unit
typechecks by (Typ write stuck). Thus, by (Typ pack) and (Typ
evaluate), we add the following hypothesis to the typing environ-
ment.
binVirus : (∇Low.Bin(Unit))
Low
Let TbinVirus = (∇Low. Bin(Unit))Low. Next, by (Typ new) and
(Typ evaluate), we add the following hypothesis to the typing
environment.
virus.exe : Obj(TbinVirus)
Low
Finally, the judgment
Γ, . . . , virus.exe : Obj(TbinVirus)
Low ⊢Low url := virus.exe
can be derived by (Typ write), after massaging the typing hypothe-
sis for virus.exe to the required Low by (Typ subsumption⊥-II).
On the other hand, the process [High] (. . . ) does not typecheck;
as seen above, an intermediate judgment
Γ ⊢High exec setup.exe :
cannot be derived, since (Typ execute) does not apply.
To understand this situation further, let us consider some varia-
tions where (Typ execute) does apply. Suppose that the code exec z
is forked in a new process whose label is lowered to Low. Then p2
typechecks. In particular, the following judgment can be derived by
applying (Typ execute).
Γ ⊢High [Low] exec setup.exe :
Fortunately, the erasure of home now blocks by access control at
runtime, so DFI is not violated.
Next, suppose that the static annotation for setup.exe is High
instead of Low, and setup.exe is initialized by a process with
label High instead of Low. Then p2 typechecks. In particular, the
type of setup.exe in Γ becomes Obj( High). We need to derive an
intermediate judgment
Γ, . . . , x : ⊢Low setup.exe := x : Unit
This judgment can be derived by applying (Typ write stuck) in-
stead of (Typ write). Fortunately, the overwrite of setup.exe now
blocks by access control at runtime, so DFI is not violated.
Finally, we sketch how typechecking fails for the violations of
DFI described in Section 2.2.
(Write and copy) Let the type of ω be Obj( S), where O ⊒ S ⊐
P. Then the write to ω(O) does not typecheck, since the value
to be written is read from ω′(P) and thus has some effect E such
that E ⊑ P, so that E ⊏ S.
(Copy and execute) Let the type of ω′ be Obj( S′). If S′ ⊑ O
then the execution of ω′(P) by q(P) does not typecheck, since
S′ ⊏ P. If S′ ⊐ O then the write to ω′(P) does not typecheck,
since the value to be written is read from ω(O) and thus has
some effect E such that E ⊑ O, so that E ⊏ S′.
(Unprotect, write, and protect) Let the type of ω be Obj( S),
where O ⊒ S ⊐ P. Then the unprotection of ω(O) does not
typecheck, since P ⊏ S.
(Copy, protect, and execute) Let the type of ω′ be Obj( S′),
where S′ ⊑ O. Then the execution of ω′(P) does not type-
check, since S′ ⊏ P.
5. Properties of typing
In this section we show several properties of typing, and prove
that DFI is preserved by well-typed code under arbitrary untrusted
environments. All proof details appear in Appendix A.
We begin with the proposition that untrusted code can always
be accommodated by the type system.
Definition 5.1 (Adversary). A C-adversary is any process of the
form [C] that does not contain stores, explicit substitutions, and
static trust annotations that are higher than C.
Proposition 5.2 (Adversary completeness). Let Γ be any typing
environment and c be any C-adversary such that fv(c) ⊆ dom(Γ).
Then Γ ⊢⊤ c : despite C.
Proposition 5.2 provides a simple way to quantify over arbi-
trary environments. By (Typ fork) the composition of a well-typed
process with any such environment remains well-typed, and thus
enjoys all the properties of typing.
Next, we present a monotonicity property of typing that is key
to decidable and efficient typechecking (Appendix B).
Proposition 5.3 (Monotonicity). The following inference rule is
admissible.
Γ ⊢P′ f : τ
E
f P ⊑ P′
Γ ⊢P f : τ
E⊓P
This rule formalizes Invariant (5), and allows inference of “most
general” types for packed code (Appendix B). Further, it implies
an intuitive proof principle—code that is proved safe to run with
higher privileges remains safe to run with lower privileges, and con-
versely, code that is proved safe against a more powerful adversary
remains safe against a less powerful adversary.
The key property of typing is that it is preserved by structural
equivalence and reduction. Preservation depends delicately on the
design of the typing rules, relying on the systematic maintenance of
typing invariants. We write Γ ⊢ σ, meaning that “the substitution
environment σ is consistent with the typing environment Γ”, if for
all x/u@ P ∈ σ there exists T such that x : T ∈ Γ and Γ ⊢P u : T .
Theorem 5.4 (Preservation). Suppose that Γ ⊢ σ and Γ ⊢P a : .
Then
• if a ≡ b then Γ ⊢P b : ;
• if a P;σ−→ b then Γ ⊢P b : .
We now present our formal protection guarantee for well-typed
code. We begin by strengthening the definition of DFI in Section 3.
In particular, we assume that part of the adversary is known and part
of it is unknown. This assumption allows the analysis to exploit any
sound typing information that may be obtained from the known part
of the adversary. (As a special case, the adversary may be entirely
unknown, of course. In this case, we recover Definition 3.4; see
below.) Let Ω be the set of objects that require protection from
labels L or lower. We let the unknown part of the adversary execute
with some process label C (⊑ L). We say that Ω is protected if no
such adversary can write any instance that flows from L or lower,
to any object in Ω.
Definition 5.5 (Strong DFI). A set of objects Ω is protected by
code a from label L despite C (⊑ L) if there is no ω ∈ Ω, C-
adversary c, substitution environment σ, and instance x such that
a  c
⊤,∅
−→⋆ E⊤,∅Jω 7→ xK⊤,σ and x
σ
H L.
For example, we may want to prove that some code protects a
set of High-objects from Medium despite (the compromised label)
Low; then we need to show that no instance may flow from Medium
or lower to any of those High-objects under any Low-adversary.
We pick objects that require protection based on their types and
effects in the typing environment.
Definition 5.6 (Trusted objects). The set of objects whose contents
are trusted beyond the label L in the typing environment Γ is
{ω | ω : Obj( S)E ∈ Γ and S ⊓ E ⊐ L}.
Suppose that in some typing environment, Ω is the set of ob-
jects whose contents are trusted beyond label L, and C (⊑ L) is
compromised; we guarantee that Ω is protected by any well-typed
code from L despite C.
Theorem 5.7 (Enforcement of strong DFI). Let Ω be the set of
objects whose contents are trusted beyond L in Γ. Suppose that
Γ ⊢⊤ a : despite C, where C ⊑ L. Then a protects Ω from L
despite C.
In the special case where the adversary is entirely unknown, we
simply consider L and C to be the same label.
The type system further enforces DFI for new objects, as can be
verified by applying Theorem 5.4, (Typ substitute), and Theorem
5.7. Finally, the type system suggests a sound runtime optimization:
whenever a well-typed process executes packed code in a trusted
context, the current process label is already appropriately lowered
for execution.
Theorem 5.8 (Redundancy of execution control). Suppose that
Γ ⊢⊤ a : despite C and a
⊤;∅
−→⋆ E⊤;∅Jω
O
7→  exec ω′KP;σ
such that ω σ= ω′ and P ⊐ C. Then P ⊑ O.
It follows that the rule (Reduct execute) can be safely opti-
mized as follows.
ω
σ
= ω′ pack(f) ∈ σ(x)
ω
O
7→ x  exec ω′
P;σ
−→ ω
O
7→ x  f
This optimization should not be surprising. Lowering the process
label for execution aims to prevent trusted code from executing
untrusted code in trusted contexts; our core static discipline on
trusted code effectively subsumes this runtime control. On the other
hand, write-access control cannot be eliminated by any discipline
on trusted code, since that control is required to restrict untrusted
code.
Lastly, typechecking can be efficiently mechanized thanks to
Proposition 5.3 and our syntactic restriction on nested packing. A
typechecking algorithm is outlined in Appendix B.
Theorem 5.9 (Typechecking). Given a typing environment Γ and
code a with L distinct labels, the problem of whether there exists T
such that Γ ⊢⊤ a : T , is decidable in time O(L|a|), where |a| is
the size of a.
6. Limitations, related work, and discussion
In this paper we formalize DFI—a multi-level integrity property
based on explicit flows—and present a type system that can effi-
ciently enforce DFI in a language that simulates Windows Vista’s
security environment.
Not surprisingly, our type system is only a conservative tech-
nique to enforce DFI—while every program that typechecks is
guaranteed to satisfy DFI (as stated in Theorem 5.7), well-typedness
is not necessary for DFI.
By design, our analysis is control-insensitive—it does not track
implicit flows. In many applications, implicit flows are of serious
concern. It remains possible to extend our analysis to account for
such flows, following the ideas of [50, 54, 38, 36]. However, we
believe that it is more practical to enforce a weaker property like
DFI at the level of an operating system, and enforce stronger,
control-sensitive properties like noninterference at the level of the
application, with specific assumptions.
Our core security calculus is simplified, although we take care
to include all aspects that require conceptual modeling for reason-
ing about DFI. In particular, we model threads, mutable references,
binaries, and data and code pointers; other features of x86 binaries,
such as recursion, control flow, and parameterized procedures, can
be encoded in the core calculus. We also model all details of Win-
dows Vista that are relevant for mandatory integrity control with
dynamic labels. On the other hand, we do not model details such as
discretionary access control, file virtualization, and secure autho-
rization of privilege escalation [31], which can improve the preci-
sion of our analysis. Building a typechecker that works at the level
of x86 binaries and handles all details of Windows Vista requires
more work. At the same time, we believe that our analysis can be
applied to more concrete programming models by translation.
Our work is closely related to that of Tse and Zdancewic [48]
and Zheng and Myers [59] on noninterference in lambda calculi
with dynamic security levels. While Tse and Zdancewic do not
consider mutable references in their language, it is possible to
encode the sequential fragment of our calculus in the language of
Zheng and Myers; however, well-typed programs in that fragment
that rely on access control for DFI do not remain well-typed via
such an encoding. Specifically, any restrictive access check for
integrity in the presence of dynamically changing labels seems to
let the adversary influence trusted computations in their system,
violating noninterference [58].
Noninterference is known to be problematic for concurrent lan-
guages. In this context, Zdancewic and Myers study the notion of
observational determinism [56]; Abadi, Hennessy and Riely, and
others study information flow using testing equivalence [1, 28]; and
Boudol and Castellani, Honda and Yoshida, and others use stronger
notions based on observational equivalence [10, 29]. Sophisticated
techniques that involve linearity, race analysis, behavior types, and
liveness analysis also appear in the literature [29, 56, 28, 32]. While
most of these techniques are developed in the setting of the pi cal-
culus, other works consider distributed and higher-order settings to
study mobile code [27, 53, 45] (as in this work).
DFI being a safety property [7] gets around some of the dif-
ficulties posed by noninterference. A related approach guides the
design of the operating systems Asbestos [19] and HiStar [57], and
dates back to the Clark-Wilson approach to security in commercial
computer systems [15, 46]. In comparison with generic models of
trace-based integrity that appear in protocol analysis, such as cor-
respondence assertions [25, 22], our integrity model is far more
specialized; as a consequence, our type system requires far less an-
notations than type systems for proving correspondence assertions.
Our definition of DFI relies on an operational semantics based
on explicit substitution. Explicit substitution, as introduced by
Abadi et al. [4], has been primarily applied to study the correctness
of abstract machines for programming languages (whose semantics
rely on substitution as a rather inefficient meta-operation), and in
proof environments. It also appears in the applied pi calculus [5] to
facilitate an elegant formulation of indistinguishability for security
analysis. However, we seem to be the first to use explicit substitu-
tions to track explicit flows in a concurrent language. Previously,
dependency analysis [35, 6] has been applied to information-flow
analysis [2, 41, 55]. These analyses track stronger dependencies
than those induced by explicit flows; in particular, the dependen-
cies are sensitive to control flows. In contrast, the use of explicit
substitutions to track explicit flows seems rather obvious and ap-
propriate in hindsight. We believe that this technique should be
useful in other contexts as well.
Our analysis manifests a genuine interplay between static typ-
ing and dynamic access control for runtime protection. We seem to
be the first to study this interaction in a concurrent system with dy-
namic labels for multi-level integrity. This approach of combining
static and dynamic protection mechanisms is reflected in previous
work, e.g., on typing for noninterference in a Java-like language
with stack inspection and other extensions [8, 40], for noninter-
ference in lambda calculi with runtime principals and dynamic la-
bels [48, 59], and for secrecy in concurrent storage calculi with
discretionary access control mechanisms [14, 13]. A verification
technique based on this approach is developed by Flanagan [21]
for a lambda calculus with arbitrary base refinement types. In these
studies and ours, dynamic checks complement static analysis where
possible or as required, so that safety violations that are not caught
statically are always caught at runtime. Moreover, static typing
sometimes subsumes certain dynamic checks (as in our analysis),
suggesting sound runtime optimizations. This approach is reflected
in previous work on static access control [28, 42, 30].
In most real-world systems, striking the right balance between
security and practice is a delicate task that is never far from con-
troversy. It is reassuring to discover that perhaps, such a balance
can be enforced formally in a contemporary operating system, and
possibly improved in future ones.
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Appendix
In this appendix, we provide some additional material that may
benefit the reader. First, we detail proofs of our results on typing
(Appendix A). Next, we outline an efficient typechecking algorithm
(Appendix B).
A. Proofs
In this section we outline proofs of the results in Section 5.
Restatement of Proposition 5.2 (Adversary completeness) Let Γ
be any typing environment and e be any C-adversary such that
fv(e) ⊆ dom(Γ). Then Γ ⊢⊤ e : despite C.
Proof. We prove typability by induction on the structure of pro-
cesses.
• e ≡ x where u is a variable.
Then x ∈ dom(Γ).
By (Typ value) Γ ⊢C x : .
• e ≡ new(x # S).
By I.H. Γ ⊢C x : τE
Then S ⊑ C ⊑ ⊥ ⊑ E.
By (Typ new) Γ ⊢C new(x # S) : .
• e ≡ 〈O〉 ω.
By I.H. Γ ⊢C ω : .
So by (Typ value) ω : τE ∈ Γ.
Case ∗E and τ is not of the form Obj( ).
By (Typ bogus stuck-I) Γ ⊢C 〈O〉 ω : .
Case ∗E, τ = Obj( S), and C ⊏ S ⊔O.
By (Typ un/protect stuck) Γ ⊢C 〈O〉 ω : .
Case ∗E, τ = Obj( S), and ⊥ ⊑ S ⊔ O ⊑ C = ⊥.
Then S ⊑ O.
By (Typ value) and (Typ un/protect)
Γ ⊢C 〈O〉 ω : .
Case E = ⊥.
By (Typ subsumption⊥-II)
τ = Obj( S) such that S ⊑ O.
By (Typ value) and (Typ un/protect)
Γ ⊢C 〈O〉 ω : .
• e ≡ !ω.
By I.H. Γ ⊢C ω : .
So by (Typ value) ω : τE ∈ Γ.
Case ∗E and τ is not of the form Obj( ).
By (Typ bogus stuck-I) Γ ⊢C !ω : .
Case ∗E and τ = Obj( ).
By (Typ read) Γ ⊢C !ω : .
Case E = ⊥.
By (Typ subsumption⊥-II) τ = Obj( ).
By (Typ read) Γ ⊢C !ω : .
• e ≡ ω := x.
By I.H. Γ ⊢C ω : and Γ ⊢C x : τE
′
1 .
So by (Typ value) ω : τE ∈ Γ.
Case ∗E and τ is not of the form Obj( ).
By (Typ bogus stuck-I) Γ ⊢C ω := x : .
Case ∗E, τ = Obj( S), and C ⊏ S.
By (Typ write stuck) Γ ⊢C ω := x : .
Case ∗E, τ = Obj(τ S1 ), and ⊥ ⊑ S ⊑ C = ⊥.
Then S ⊑ E′.
By (Typ value) and (Typ write) Γ ⊢C ω := x : .
Case E = ⊥.
By (Typ subsumption⊥-II)
τ = Obj(τ S1 ) such that S ⊑ E′.
By (Typ value) and (Typ write) Γ ⊢C ω := x : .
• e ≡ pack(f).
By I.H. Γ ⊢C f : T .
By (Typ pack) Γ ⊢C pack(f) : .
• e ≡ exec ω.
By I.H. Γ ⊢C ω : , so by (Typ value) ω : τE ∈ Γ.
Case ∗E and τ is not of the form Obj( ).
By (Typ bogus stuck-I) Γ ⊢C exec ω : .
Case τ = Obj(τ S1 ), ∗E,
and τ1 is not of the form ∇ .Bin( ).
By (Typ bogus stuck-II) Γ ⊢C exec ω : .
Case τ = Obj(τ S1 ), ∗E, and τ1 = ∇P.Bin( ).
Then C = ⊥ ⊑ P ⊓ S.
By (Typ execute) Γ ⊢C exec ω : .
Case E = ⊥.
By (Typ subsumption⊥-II)
τ = Obj(τ S1 ) and τ1 = ∇P.Bin( )
such that C = ⊥ ⊑ P ⊓ S.
By (Typ execute) Γ ⊢C exec ω : .
Case ∗E, τ = Obj(τ S1 ), and S = ⊥.
By (Typ subsumption⊥-I)
τ1 = ∇P.Bin( ) such that C = ⊥ ⊑ P ⊓ S.
By (Typ execute) Γ ⊢C exec ω : .
• e ≡ [P] a.
If P ⊐ C then by (Typ escalate) Γ ⊢C [P] a : .
Otherwise by I.H. Γ ⊢P a : .
By (Typ limit) Γ ⊢C [P] a : .
• e ≡ let x = a in b.
By I.H. Γ ⊢C a : T
and Γ, x : T ⊢C b : T ′.
By (Typ evaluate) Γ ⊢C let x = a in b : .
• e ≡ a  b.
By I.H. Γ ⊢C a :
and Γ ⊢C b : T .
By (Typ fork) Γ ⊢C a  b : . ◭
Restatement of Proposition 5.3 (Monotonicity) The following typ-
ing rule is admissible.
Γ ⊢P′ f : τ
E
f P ⊏ P′
Γ ⊢P f : τ
E⊓P
Proof. We proceed by induction on the structure of derivations.
Suppose that P′ ⊏ P.
Case (Typ variable)
x : τE ∈ Γ
Γ ⊢P x : τ
E⊓P
By (Typ value) Γ ⊢P x : τE⊓P′ .
Here E ⊓ P′ = E ⊓ P ⊓ P′.
Case (Typ new)
Γ ⊢P x : τ
E
S ⊑ E
Γ ⊢P new(x # S) : Obj(τ S)P
By I.H. Γ ⊢P′ x : τE⊓P
′
Then S ⊑ E ⊓ P′.
By (Typ new) Γ ⊢P′ new(x # S) : Obj(τ S)P
′
.
Here P′ = P ⊓ P′.
Case (Typ fork)
Γ ⊢P a : Γ ⊢P b : T
Γ ⊢P a  b : T
Let T = τE.
By I.H. Γ ⊢P′ a : and Γ ⊢P′ b : τE⊓P
′
.
By (Typ fork) Γ ⊢P′ a  b : τE⊓P
′
.
Case (Typ store)
{ω : Obj(τ S) , x : τE} ⊆ Γ S ⊑ O ⊓ E
Γ ⊢P ω
O
7→ x : P
By (Typ store) Γ ⊢P′ ω O7→ x : P
′
.
Here P′ = P ⊓ P′.
Case (Typ un/protect)
Γ ⊢P ω : Obj(τ
S)E S ⊑ O
Γ ⊢P 〈O〉 ω : Unit
P
∗P ⇒ ∗E
By I.H. Γ ⊢P′ ω : Obj(τ S)E⊓P
′
and if ∗P′ then ∗P, then ∗E, and then ∗(E ⊓ P′).
By (Typ un/protect) Γ ⊢P′ 〈O〉 ω : UnitP
′
.
Case (Typ write)
Γ ⊢P ω : Obj(τ
S)E Γ ⊢P x : τ
E′
S ⊑ E′
Γ ⊢P ω := x : Unit
P
∗P ⇒ ∗E
By I.H. Γ ⊢P′ ω : Obj(τ S)E⊓P
′
and Γ ⊢P′ x : τE
′⊓P′
and if ∗L′r then ∗P, then ∗E, and then ∗(E ⊓ P′)
and S ⊓ P′ ⊑ E′ ⊓ P′.
If S ⊑ P′ then S ⊑ E′ ⊓ P′.
By (Typ write) Γ ⊢P′ ω := x : UnitP
′
.
Otherwise P′ ⊏ S, so that ∗S.
Because S ⊑ E′ ⊑ P, we have ∗P and thus ∗E.
By (Typ value) ω : Obj(τ S)E′′ ∈ Γ and E ⊑ E′′.
Then ∗E′′.
By (Typ write stuck) Γ ⊢P ω := x : Stuck.
By (Typ subsumption stuck-II) Γ ⊢P ω := x : UnitP′ .
Case (Typ execute)
ω : Obj((∇P′′ .Bin(τ
E′))S)E ∈ Γ P ⊑ P′′ ⊓ S
Γ ⊢P exec ω : τ
E′⊓P
∗P ⇒ ∗E
P′ ⊏ P ⊑ P′′ ⊓ S
and if ∗L′r then ∗P, and then ∗E.
By (Typ execute) Γ ⊢P′ exec ω : τE
′⊓P′
.
Here E′ ⊓ P′ = E′ ⊓ P ⊓ P′.
Case (Typ read)
ω : Obj(τ S)E ∈ Γ
Γ ⊢P !ω : τ
S⊓P
∗(S ⊓ P)⇒ ∗E
If ∗(S ⊓ P′) then ∗(S ⊓ P), and then ∗E.
By (Typ read) Γ ⊢P′ !ω : τ S⊓P
′
.
Here S ⊓ P′ = S ⊓ P ⊓ P′.
Case (Typ limit)
Γ ⊢P′′ a : T
Γ ⊢P [P
′′] a : T
Let T = τE.
Then E ⊑ P′′.
If P′′ ⊑ P′ then
E ⊓ P′ = E.
By (Typ limit) Γ ⊢P′ [P′′] a : τE⊓P
′
.
Otherwise P′ ⊏ P′′.
By (Typ escalate stuck) Γ ⊢P′ [P′′] a : Stuck.
By (Typ subsumption stuck-II) Γ ⊢P′ [P′′] a : τE⊓P
′
.
Case (Typ evaluate)
Γ ⊢P a : T
′ Γ, x : T ′ ⊢P b : T
Γ ⊢P let x = a in b : T
Let T = τE.
By I.H. Γ ⊢P′ a : T ′′ and Γ, x : T ′′ ⊢P′ b : τE⊓P
′
.
By (Typ evaluate) Γ ⊢P′ let x = a in b : τE⊓P
′
.
Case (Typ substitute)
Γ ⊢P′ µ : T
′ Γ, x : T ′ ⊢P a : T
Γ ⊢P (νx/µ@P
′) a : T
Let T = τE.
By I.H. Γ, x : T ′ ⊢P′ a : τE⊓P
′
.
By (Typ substitute) Γ⊢P′ (νx/µ@P′) a : τE⊓P
′
. ◭
Lemma A.1 (Bind). Suppose that a = a′{x/y}. Then Γ ⊢P a :
if and only if Γ ⊢P (νx/y@P) a′.
Proof. By induction on the structure of a′. ◭
Restatement of Theorem 5.4 (Type preservation) Suppose that
Γ ⊢P σ and Γ ⊢P a : . Then
1. If a ≡ b then Γ ⊢P b : .
2. If a P;σ−→ b then Γ ⊢P b : .
Proof of (1). We prove preservation under ≡ by induction on the
structure of derivations.
EL;σ ::= evaluation context
•L;σ hole
let x = EL;σ in b evaluate sequential
EL;σ  b fork child
a  EL;σ fork parent
(νx/µ@L′) EL;{x/µ@L′}∪σ restrict substitution
[L′] EL′;σ (L
′ ⊑ L) lower process label
Case (Struct substitution)
x /∈ fv(EL;σ) ∪ bv(EL;σ) fv(µ) ∩ bv(EL;σ) = ∅
(νx/µ@L′′) EL,{x/µ@L′′}∪σJaKL′;σ′ ≡ EL;σJ(νx/µ@L
′′) aKL′;σ′
Let σ′′ = {x/µ@L′′} ∪ σ.
• (νx/µ@L′′) let y = EL;σ′′Ja
′KL′;σ′ in b
′
≡ let y = EL;σJ(νx/µ@L
′′) a′KL′;σ′ in b
′
and Γ′ ⊢L (νx/µ@L′′) let y = EL;σ′′Ja′KL′;σ′ in b′ : T .
By (Typ substitute) and (Typ evaluate)
Γ′ ⊢L′′ µ : T
′′
and Γ′, x : T ′′ ⊢L EL;σ′′Ja′KL′;σ′ : T ′′′
and Γ′, x : T ′′, y : T ′′′ ⊢L b′ : T .
By (Typ substitute) and S.R.
Γ′ ⊢L (νx/µ@L
′′) EL;σ′′Ja
′KL′;σ′ : T
′′′
and Γ′, y : T ′′′ ⊢L b′ : T .
By I.H. Γ′ ⊢L EL;σJ(νx/µ@L′′) a′KL′;σ′ : T ′′′.
By (Typ evaluate)
Γ′ ⊢L let y = EL;σJ(νx/µ@L
′′) a′KL′;σ′ in b
′ : T .
• (νx/µ@L′′) EL;σ′′Ja
′KL′;σ′  b
′
≡ EL;σJ(νx/µ@L
′′) a′KL′;σ′  b
′
and Γ′ ⊢L (νx/µ@L′′) EL;σ′′Ja′KL′;σ′  b′ : T .
By (Typ substitute) and (Typ fork)
Γ′ ⊢L′′ µ : T
′′
and Γ′, x : T ′′ ⊢L EL;σ′′Ja′KL′;σ′ : T ′′′
and Γ′, x : T ′′ ⊢L b′ : T .
By (Typ substitute) and S.R.
Γ′ ⊢L (νx/µ@L
′′) EL;σ′′Ja
′KL′;σ′ : T
′′′
and Γ′ ⊢L b′ : T .
By I.H. Γ′ ⊢L EL;σJ(νx/µ@L′′) a′KL′;σ′ : T ′′′.
By (Typ fork)
Γ′ ⊢L EL;σJ(νx/µ@L
′′) a′KL′;σ′  b
′ : T .
• (νx/µ@L′′) b′  EL;σ′′Ja
′KL′;σ′
≡ b′  EL;σJ(νx/µ@L
′′) a′KL′;σ′
and Γ′ ⊢L (νx/µ@L′′) b′  EL;σ′′Ja′KL′;σ′ : T .
By (Typ substitute) and (Typ fork)
Γ′ ⊢L′′ µ : T
′′
and Γ′, x : T ′′ ⊢L EL;σ′′Ja′KL′;σ′ : T
and Γ′, x : T ′′ ⊢L b′ : T ′′′.
By (Typ substitute) and S.R.
Γ′ ⊢L (νx/µ@L
′′) EL;σ′′Ja
′KL′;σ′ : T
and Γ′ ⊢L b′ : T ′′′.
By I.H. Γ′ ⊢L EL;σJ(νx/µ@L′′) a′KL′;σ′ : T .
By (Typ fork)
Γ′ ⊢L b
′  EL;σJ(νx/µ@L
′′) a′KL′;σ′ : T .
• (νx/µ@L′′) (νy/µ′@L′′′) EL;σ′′Ja
′KL′;σ′
≡ (νy/µ′@L′′′) EL;σJ(νx/µ@L
′′) a′KL′;σ′
and Γ′ ⊢L (νx/µ@L′′) (νy/µ′@L′′′) EL;σ′′Ja′KL′;σ′ : T .
By (Typ substitute) and (Typ substitute)
Γ′ ⊢L′′ µ : T
′′
and Γ′, x : T ′′ ⊢L′′′ v : T ′′′
and Γ′, x : T ′′, y : T ′′′ ⊢L EL;σ′′Ja′KL′;σ′ : T .
By (Typ substitute) and S.R.
Γ′, , y : T ′′′ ⊢L′′ u : T
′′
and Γ′ ⊢L′′′ µ′ : T ′′′
and Γ′, y : T ′′′, x : T ′′ ⊢L EL;σ′′Ja′KL′;σ′ : T .
By (Typ substitute)
Γ′, y : T ′′′ ⊢L (νx/µ@L
′′) EL;σ′′Ja
′KL′;σ′ : T .
By I.H. Γ′, y : T ′′′ ⊢L EL;σJ(νx/µ@L′′) a′KL′;σ′ : T .
By (Typ substitute)
Γ′ ⊢L (νy/µ
′@L′′′) EL;σJ(νx/µ@L
′′) a′KL′;σ′ : T .
• (νx/µ@L′′) [L′′′] EL′′′;σ′′Ja
′KL′;σ′
≡ [L′′′] EL′′′;σJ(νx/µ@L
′′) a′KL′;σ′
and Γ′ ⊢L (νx/µ@L′′) [L′′′] EL′′′;σ′′Ja′KL′;σ′ : T .
By (Typ substitute) and (Typ limit)
Γ′ ⊢L′′ µ : T
′′
and Γ′, x : T ′′ ⊢L′′′ EL′′′;σ′′Ja′KL′;σ′ : T .
By (Typ substitute)
Γ′ ⊢L′′′ (νx/µ@L
′′) EL′′′;σJa
′KL′;σ′ : T .
By I.H. Γ′ ⊢L′′′ EL′′′;σJ(νx/µ@L′′) a′KL′;σ′ : T .
By (Typ limit)
Γ′ ⊢L [L
′′′] EL′′′;σJ(νx/µ@L
′′) a′KL′;σ′ : T .
Case (Struct fork)
fv(a) ∩ bv(EL;σ) = ∅
a  EL;σJbKL ≡ EL;σJa  bKL
• a′′  let x = EL;σJa
′KL in b
′
≡ let x = EL;σJa
′′  a′KL in b
′
and Γ′ ⊢L a′′  let x = EL;σJa′KL in b′ : T .
By (Typ fork) and (Typ evaluate)
Γ′ ⊢L a
′′ : T ′′
and Γ′ ⊢L EL;σJa′KL : T ′′′
and Γ′, x : T ′′′ ⊢L b′ : T .
By (Typ fork)
Γ′ ⊢L a
′′  EL;σJa
′KL : T
′′′
and Γ′, x : T ′′′ ⊢L b′ : T .
By I.H. Γ′ ⊢L EL;σJa′′  a′KL : T ′′′.
By (Typ evaluate)
Γ′ ⊢L let x = EL;σJa
′′  a′KL in b
′ : T .
• a′′  EL;σJa
′KL  b
′
≡ EL;σJa
′′  a′KL  b
′
and Γ′ ⊢L a′′  EL;σJa′KL  b′ : T .
By (Typ fork) and (Typ fork)
Γ′ ⊢L a
′′ : T ′′
and Γ′ ⊢L EL;σJa′KL : T ′′′
and Γ′ ⊢L b′ : T .
By (Typ fork)
Γ′ ⊢L a
′′  EL;σJa
′KL : T
′′′
and Γ′ ⊢L b′ : T .
By I.H. Γ′ ⊢L EL;σJa′′  a′KL : T ′′′.
By (Typ fork)
Γ′ ⊢L EL;σJa
′′  a′KL  b
′ : T .
• a′′  b′  EL;σJa
′KL
≡ b′  EL;σJa
′′  a′KL
and Γ′ ⊢L a′′  b′  EL;σJa′KL : T .
By (Typ fork) and (Typ fork)
Γ′ ⊢L a
′′ : T ′′
and Γ′ ⊢L b′ : T ′′′
and Γ′ ⊢L EL;σJa′KL : T .
By (Typ fork)
Γ′ ⊢L b
′ : T ′′′
and Γ′ ⊢L a′′  EL;σJa′KL : T .
By I.H. Γ′ ⊢L EL;σJa′′  a′KL : T .
By (Typ fork)
Γ′ ⊢L b
′  EL;σJa
′′  a′KL : T .
• a′′  (νx/µ@L′) EL;σJa
′KL
≡ (νx/u@L′) EL;σJa
′′  a′KL
and Γ′ ⊢L a′′  (νx/u@L′) EL;σJa′KL : T .
By (Typ fork) and (Typ substitute)
Γ′ ⊢L a
′′ : T ′′
and Γ′ ⊢L′;σ′ µ : T
and Γ′, x : T ′′′ ⊢L EL;σJa′KL : T .
By S.R. Γ′, x : T ′′′ ⊢L a′′ : T ′′.
By (Typ fork)
Γ′, x : T ′′′ ⊢L a
′′  EL;σJa
′KL : T .
By I.H. Γ′, x : T ′′′ ⊢L EL;σJa′′  a′KL : T .
By (Typ substitute)
Γ′ ⊢L (νx/u@L
′) EL;σJa
′′  a′KL : T .
Case (Struct store)
ω
L
7→ u  [L′] a ≡ [L′] (ω
L
7→ u  a)
ω
L′′
7→ u  [L′] a′
≡ [L′] (ω
L′′
7→ u  a′)
and Γ′ ⊢L ω
L′′
7→ u  [L′] a′ : T .
By (Typ fork)
Γ′ ⊢L ω
L′′
7→ u :
and Γ′ ⊢L [L′] a′ : T .
By (Typ limit)
Γ′ ⊢L′ ω
L′′
7→ u :
and Γ′ ⊢L′ a′ : T .
By (Typ fork) Γ′ ⊢L′ ω L
′′
7→ u  a′ : T .
By (Typ limit) Γ′ ⊢L [L′] ω L
′′
7→ u  a′ : T .
Case (Struct bind)
By Lemma A.1. ◭
Proof of (2). We prove preservation under −→ by induction on the
structure of derivations.
Case (Reduct evaluate)
let x = u in a
L;σ
−→ (νx/u@L) a
Γ ⊢L let x = u in a
′ : T .
By (Typ evaluate)
Γ ⊢L u : T
′′
and Γ, x : T ′′ ⊢L a′ : T .
By (Typ substitute) Γ ⊢L (νx/u@L) a′ : T .
Case (Reduct new)
new(x # S) P;σ−→ (νω/new(x # S)@P) (ω P7→ x  ω)
Γ ⊢P new(x # S) : T .
By (Typ new)
Γ ⊢P x : τ
E
,
S ⊑ E,
and T = Obj(τ S)P.
By (Typ store) Γ, ω : T ⊢P ω P7→ x : .
By (Typ fork) Γ, ω : T ⊢P ω P7→ x  ω : T .
By (Typ substitute)
Γ ⊢P (νω/new(x # S)@P) (ω
P
7→ x  ω) : T .
Case (Reduct read)
ω
σ
= ω′
ω
L
7→ x  !ω′
L′;σ
−→ ω
L
7→ x  x
Γ ⊢L ω
O
7→ x  !ω′ : τE.
By (Typ fork)
Γ ⊢L ω
O
7→ x : .
By (Typ store) Γ ⊢L x : .
By (Typ fork) Γ ⊢L ω O7→ x  x : .
Case (Reduct write)
ω
σ
= ω′ L ⊑ L′
ω
L
7→ x  ω′ := x′
L′;σ
−→ ω
L
7→ x′  unit
Γ ⊢L ω
O
7→ x  ω′ := x′ : UnitL.
By (Typ fork)
Γ ⊢L ω
O
7→ x :
and Γ ⊢L ω′ := x′ : UnitL
and O ⊑ L.
By (Typ store), (Typ write), and Γ ⊢ σ
ω : Obj(τ S) ∈ Γ,
S ⊑ O,
Γ ⊢L ω
′ : Obj(τ S)E,
Γ ⊢L x
′ : τE
′
,
and S ⊑ E′.
By (Typ store) Γ ⊢L ω O7→ x′ : .
By (Typ unit) Γ ⊢L ω O7→ unit : UnitL.
By (Typ fork) Γ ⊢L ω O7→ x′  unit : UnitL.
Case (Reduct execute)
ω
σ
= ω′ pack(f) ∈ σ(x) L′′ = L′ ⊓ L
ω
L
7→ x  exec ω′
L′;σ
−→ ω
L
7→ x  [L′′] f
Γ ⊢L ω
O
7→ x  exec ω′ : .
By (Typ fork)
Γ ⊢L ω
O
7→ x :
and Γ ⊢L exec ω′ : .
By (Typ store), (Typ execute), and Γ ⊢ σ
Γ ⊢P′ pack(f) : ∇P.Bin(T )
P′ for some P′,
x : ∇P.Bin(T )
E ∈ Γ,
ω : Obj(∇P.Bin(T )
S) ∈ Γ,
S ⊑ O ⊓ E,
and L ⊑ P ⊓ S.
By (Typ pack) Γ ⊢P f : .
By (Typ subsumption process label) Γ ⊢L f : .
By (Typ fork) Γ ⊢L ω O7→ x  f : .
Case (Reduct un/protect)
ω
σ
= ω′ L ⊔ L′ ⊑ L′′
ω
L
7→ x  〈L′〉 ω′
L′′;σ
−→ ω
L′
7→ x  unit
Γ ⊢L ω
O
7→ x  〈L′〉 ω′ : UnitL.
By (Typ fork)
Γ ⊢L ω
O
7→ x :
and Γ ⊢L 〈L′〉 ω′ : UnitL
O ⊔ L′ ⊑ L.
By (Typ store), (Typ un/protect), and Γ ⊢ σ,
ω : Obj(τ S) ∈ Γ,
S ⊑ O,
Γ ⊢L ω
′ : Obj(τ S) ,
and S ⊑ L′.
By (Typ store) Γ ⊢L ω L
′
7→ x : .
By (Typ unit) Γ ⊢L unit : UnitL.
By (Typ fork) Γ ⊢L ω L
′
7→ x  unit : UnitL.
Case (Reduct context)
a
L′;σ′
−→ b
EL;σJaKL′;σ′
L;σ
−→ EL;σJbKL′;σ′
EL;σ ::= evaluation context
•L;σ hole
let x = EL;σ in b evaluate sequential
EL;σ  b fork child
a  EL;σ fork parent
(νx/µ@L′) EL,{x/µ@L′}∪σ restrict substitution
[L′] EL′;σ (L
′ ⊑ L) lower process label
• let x = EL;σJa
′KL′;σ′ in b
′ L;σ−→ let x = EL;σJa
′′KL′;σ′ in b
′
,
a′
L′;σ′
−→ a′′,
and Γ ⊢L let x = EL;σJa′KL′;σ′ in b′ : T .
By (Reduct context) and (Typ evaluate)
EL;σJa
′KL′;σ′
L;σ
−→ EL[[a
′′]]L′;σ′ ,
Γ ⊢L EL;σJa
′KL′;σ′ : T
′′
,
and Γ, x : T ′′ ⊢L b′ : T .
By I.H. Γ ⊢L EL;σJa′′KL′;σ′ : T ′′.
By (Typ evaluate)
Γ ⊢L let x = EL;σJa
′′KL′;σ′ in b
′ : T .
• EL;σJa
′KL′;σ′  b
′ L;σ−→ EL;σJa
′′KL′;σ′  b
′
,
a′
L′;σ′
−→ a′′,
and Γ ⊢L EL;σJa′KL′;σ′  b′ : T .
By (Reduct context) and (Typ fork)
EL;σJa
′KL′;σ′
L;σ
−→ EL;σJa
′′KL′;σ′ ,
Γ ⊢L EL;σJa
′KL′;σ′ : T
′′
,
and Γ ⊢L b′ : T .
By I.H. Γ ⊢L EL;σJa′′KL′;σ′ : T ′′.
By (Typ fork)
Γ ⊢L EL;σJa
′′KL′;σ′  b
′ : T .
• b′  EL;σJa
′KL′;σ′
L;σ
−→ b′  EL;σJa
′′KL′;σ′ ,
a′
L′;σ′
−→ a′′,
and Γ ⊢L b′  EL;σJa′KL′;σ′ : T .
By (Reduct context) and (Typ fork)
EL;σJa
′KL′;σ′
L;σ
−→ EL;σJa
′′KL′;σ′ ,
Γ ⊢L EL;σJa
′KL′;σ′ : T ,
and Γ ⊢L b′ : T ′′.
By I.H. Γ ⊢L EL;σJa′′KL′;σ′ : T .
By (Typ fork)
Γ ⊢L b
′  EL;σJa
′′KL′;σ′ : T .
• (νx/u@L′′) EL;σJa
′KL′;σ′
L;σ
−→ (νx/u@L′′) EL;σJa
′′KL′;σ′ ,
a′
L′;σ′
−→ a′′,
and Γ ⊢L (νx/u@L′′) EL;σJa′KL′;σ′ : T .
By (Reduct context) and (Typ substitute)
EL[[a
′]]L′;σ′
L;σ
−→ EL;σJa
′′KL′;σ′ ,
and Γ ⊢L′′ u : T ′′,
and Γ, x : T ′′ ⊢L EL;σJa′KL′;σ′ : T .
By I.H. Γ, x : T ′′ ⊢L EL;σJa′′KL′;σ′ : T .
By (Typ substitute)
Γ ⊢L (νx/u@L
′′) EL;σJa
′′KL′;σ′ : T .
• [L′′] EL′′;σJa
′KL′;σ′
L;σ
−→ [L′′] EL′′;σJa
′′KL′;σ′ ,
a′
L′;σ′
−→ a′′,
and Γ ⊢L [L′′] EL′′;σJa′KL′;σ′ : T .
By (Reduct context) and (Typ limit)
EL′′;σJa
′KL′;σ′
L′′;σ
−→ EL′′;σJa
′′KL′;σ′
and Γ ⊢L′′ EL′′;σJa′KL′;σ′ : T .
By I.H. Γ ⊢L′′ EL′′;σJa′′KL′;σ′ : T .
By (Typ limit)
Γ ⊢L [L
′′] EL′′;σJa
′′KL′;σ′ : T .
Case (Reduct congruence)
a ≡ a′ a′
L;σ
−→ b′ b′ ≡ b
a
L;σ
−→ b
Γ ⊢L a : T ,
a ≡ a′,
a′
L;σ
−→ b′,
and b′ ≡ b.
By Theorem 5.4(1) Γ ⊢L a′ : .
By I.H. Γ ⊢L b′ : .
So by Theorem 5.4(1) Γ ⊢L b : . ◭
Restatement of Theorem 5.7 (Enforcement of strong DFI) Let Ω
be the set of objects whose contents are trusted beyond L in Γ.
Suppose that Γ ⊢⊤ a : despite C, where C ⊑ L. Then a protects
Ω from L despite C.
Proof. Let e be any C-adversary [C] e′.
By Proposition 5.2 Γ ⊢⊤ e : .
By (Typ fork) Γ ⊢⊤ a  e : .
Suppose that ω ∈ Ω. We need to prove that there are no σ and
x such that a  [C] e′ ⊤−→⋆ E⊤;∅Jω 7→ xK⊤;σ and x
σ
H L. Assume
otherwise.
By Theorem 5.4 there exists Γ′ extending Γ such that
Γ′ ⊢ σ and Γ′ ⊢⊤ ω 7→ x : .
By (Typ store) ω : Obj(τ S) ∈ Γ′ such that S ⊑ E.
We proceed by induction on the derivation of x
σ
H L.
Case P ⊑ L.
For some τ and E, Γ′ ⊢P µ : τE.
Then E ⊑ P and by (Typ value) Γ′ ⊢⊤ x : τE.
Then E ⊑ L.
Then S ⊑ L.
But by assumptions S ⊐ L (contradiction).
Case µ ≡ y for some y and y
σ
H L.
By I.H. Γ′ ⊢⊤ y : τE for some E such that E ⊑ L.
Then S ⊑ L.
But by assumptions S ⊐ L (contradiction). ◭
Restatement of Theorem 5.8 (Redundancy of execution control)
Suppose that Γ ⊢⊤ a : despite C and a
⊤;∅
−→⋆ E⊤;∅Jω
O
7→ x 
exec ω′KP;σ such that ω
σ
= ω′, and P ⊐ C. Then P ⊑ O.
Proof. The proof is by inspection of Case (Reduct execute) in the
proof of Theorem 5.4. Recalling that case (where L is the process
label): L ⊑ S ⊑ O. ◭
B. An efficient typechecking algorithm
Finally, we outline an efficient algorithm to mechanize typecheck-
ing. Broadly, the algorithm builds constraints and then checks
whether those constraints are satisfiable. The only complication
is due to pack processes, which require a “most general” type. We
extend the grammar of types with type variables χ, and introduce
a distinguished label ? denoting an “unknown” label. We extend
the grammar of typing environments with constraints of the form
τ1 <: τ2 and label constraints (i.e., boolean formulae over atoms of
the form L1 ⊑ L2). Next, we introduce the following typechecking
judgments:
Typechecking judgments for processes Γ ⊢P a : T ⊲ Γ′
(Typc value)
x : τE ∈ Γ
Γ ⊢P x : τ
E⊓P
⊲ ∅
(Typc new)
Γ ⊢P u : τ
E
⊲ ∅ . . .
Γ ⊢P new(u # S) : Obj(τ S)P ⊲ ∅
(Typc pack)
Γ ⊢ f : T ⊲ Γ′ Γ′ |= P′ f
Γ ⊢P pack(f) : χ
P
⊲ Γ′? 7→P′ ,∇P′ .Bin(T ) <: χ
(Typc fork)
Γ ⊢P a : ⊲ Γ1 Γ ⊢P b : T ⊲ Γ2
Γ ⊢P a  b : T ⊲ Γ1,Γ2
(Typc evaluate)
Γ ⊢P a : T
′
⊲ Γ1 Γ,Γ1, x : T
′ ⊢P b : T ⊲ Γ2
Γ ⊢P let x = a in b : T ⊲ Γ1,Γ2
(Typc read)
ω : Obj(τ S)E ∈ Γ . . .
Γ ⊢P !ω : τ
S⊓P
⊲ ∅
(Typc write)
Γ ⊢P ω : Obj(τ
S
1 )
E Γ ⊢P u : τ
E′
2 . . .
Γ ⊢P ω := u : Obj(τ
S)E ⊲ τ2 <: τ1
(Typc execute)
ω : Obj(τ S1 )
E,∇P′ .Bin(τ
E′) <: τ1 ∈ Γ . . .
Γ ⊢P exec ω : τ
E′⊓P
⊲ τ1 <: ∇P.Bin(τ
P′⊓P)
. . .
• Γ ⊢P a : T ⊲ Γ
′
, where Γ′ contains constraints of the form
τ1 <: τ2 only (i.e., the label constraint in Γ′ is true).
• Γ ⊢ f : T ⊲Γ′, where Γ′ may contain a label constraint as well
as constraints of the form τ1 <: τ2.
We now present some sample typechecking rules, followed by rules
that interpret<:. Let us first look at the rules for deriving judgments
of the form Γ ⊢P a : T ⊲ Γ′. These rules build constraints of
the form τ1 <: τ2 in Γ′. We elide by dots (. . . ) label constraints
that appear in the original typing rules. Let Γ′? 7→L denote the typing
environment obtained from Γ′ by replacing all occurrences of ?
with L. We write Γ′ |= P iff P is the highest L for which the label
constraint in Γ′? 7→L is true. Note that to derive a judgment of this
form for a process pack(f), we need to derive a judgment of the
other form for f . In fact, the two kinds of judgments are mutually
recursive (see below).
Next, we look at the rules for deriving judgments of the form
Γ ⊢ f : T ⊲ Γ′. These rules apply to expressions that are not
explicitly under a change of the process label, e.g., expressions
obtained by unpacking pack processes. They build label constraints
from those that appear in the original typing rules; the implicit
(unknown) process label is replaced by ?. Predicate  ensures that
Typechecking judgments for expressions Γ ⊢ f : T ⊲ Γ′
(Typc ? value)
x : τE ∈ Γ
Γ ⊢ x : τE⊓? ⊲ ∅
(Typc ? limit)
Γ? 7→P′ ⊢P′ a : T ⊲ Γ
′
Γ ⊢ [P′] a : T ⊲ Γ′
(Typc ? read)
ω : Obj(τ S)E ∈ Γ
Γ ⊢ !ω : τ S⊓? ⊲ . . .
(Typc ? write)
Γ ⊢ ω : Obj(τ S1 )
E Γ ⊢ u : τE
′
2
Γ ⊢ ω := u : Obj(τ S)E ⊲ τ2 <: τ1, . . .
(Typc ? execute)
ω : Obj(τ S1 )
E,∇P′ .Bin(τ
E′) <: τ1 ∈ Γ
Γ ⊢ exec ω : τE
′⊓?
⊲ τ1 <: ∇?.Bin(τ
P′⊓?), . . .
(Typc ? fork)
Γ ⊢ a : ⊲ Γ1 Γ ⊢ b : T ⊲ Γ2
Γ ⊢ f  g : T ⊲ Γ1,Γ2
(Typc ? evaluate)
Γ ⊢ a : T ′ ⊲ Γ1 Γ,Γ1, x : T
′ ⊢ b : T ⊲ Γ2
Γ ⊢ let x = f in g : T ⊲ Γ1,Γ2
. . .
Satisfiability of constraints Γ ⊢ ⋄
(Typc <: obj)
Γ ⊢ ⋄
Γ,Obj(T ) <: Obj(T ) ⊢ ⋄
(Typc <: bin)
P
′ ⊑ P Γ, τ1 <: τ2 ⊢ ⋄
Γ,∇P.Bin(τ
E
1 ) <: ∇P′ .Bin(τ
E⊓P′
2 ) ⊢ ⋄
(Typc <: left)
Γ, χ <: ∇P.Bin(τ
E
1 ),∇P.Bin(τ
E
1 ) <: ∇P′ .Bin(τ
E′
2 ) ⊢ ⋄
Γ, χ <: ∇P.Bin(τ
E
1 ), χ <: ∇P′ .Bin(τ
E′
2 ) ⊢ ⋄
(Typc <: right)
Γ,∇P.Bin(τ
E
1 ) <: ∇P′ .Bin(τ
E′
2 ),∇P′ .Bin(τ
E′
2 ) <: χ ⊢ ⋄
Γ,∇P.Bin(τ
E
1 ) <: χ,∇P′ .Bin(τ
E′
2 ) <: χ ⊢ ⋄
(Typc <: middle)
Γ,∇P.Bin(τ
E
1 ) <: χ, χ <: ∇P′ .Bin(τ
E′
2 ),
∇P.Bin(τ
E
1 ) <: ∇P′ .Bin(τ
E′
2 ) ⊢ ⋄
Γ,∇P.Bin(τ
E
1 ) <: χ, χ <: ∇P′ .Bin(τ
E′
2 ) ⊢ ⋄
. . .
we do not need to consider pack processes here; further we can
assume that all annotations carry the least trusted label. Once we
have an expression of the form [P] a, we can derive a judgment of
the other form for a.
Finally, we look at the rules that interpret constraints of the form
τ1 <: τ2. Here <: denotes a subtyping relation that is invariant in
Obj( S) and covariant in ∇P.Bin( E), and preserves monotonic-
ity. We introduce the judgment Γ ⊢ ⋄ to check satisfiability of such
constraints.
We prove that typechecking is sound and complete.
Proposition B.1. The typing judgment Γ ⊢P a : can be derived
if and only if the typechecking judgment Γ ⊢P a : T ⊲ Γ′ can be
derived for some T and Γ′ such that Γ′ ⊢ ⋄.
Further, typechecking terminates in time O(L|a|)) if Γ and a have
L distinct labels. Indeed, let ϕ(|a|) be the running time of the
judgment Γ ⊢P a : ⊲ , and ψ(|f |) be the total running time
of the judgments Γ ⊢ f : ⊲ Γ′ and Γ′ |= for some Γ′.
Building constraints for the typechecking judgment Γ ⊢⊤ a :
T ⊲ Γ′ takes time
ϕ(|a|) = O(|a|+ Σi∈1..nψ(|fi|))
if a contains as subterms the processes pack(f1), . . . , pack(fn)
without nesting. Checking the satisfiability of those constraints
reduces to detecting cycles in a graph, and takes time O(|a|)), so
the total running time for typechecking is
Φ(|a|) = ϕ(|a|) +O(|a|)
= O(|a|+ Σi∈1..nψ(|fi|))
Next, building the label constraint for the typechecking judgment
Γ ⊢ fi : T ⊲ Γ
′ takes time O(|fi| + Σj∈1..miϕ(|a′ij |)) if
fi contains as subterms the processes [Pi1] a′i1, . . . , [Pimi ] a′imi
without nesting. Finding L such that Γ′ |= L takes time O(L|fi|)),
since at most O(L) labels need to be checked. So
ψ(|fi|) = O(|fi|+ Σj∈1..miϕ(|aij |)) +O(L|fi|)
= O(L|fi|+Σj∈1..miϕ(|aij |))
Plugging the expansion of ψ into the expansion of Φ, and solving
by induction:
Φ(|a|) = O(|a|+ Σi∈1..nL|fi|+ Σi∈1..n,j∈1..miϕ(|aij |))
= O(L|a|)
